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Small-c conservatism, understood as a philosophy of change and risk, clearly has a lot 
in  common  with  its  etymological  relation  ‘conservationism’.  Many  conservative 
politicians such as Newt Gingrich and David Cameron, and philosophers, including 
Burke, Disraeli and Roger Scruton (as well as the protean outlier John Gray),
1 have 
powerfully  described  the  environment  as  an  important  source  of  value  whose 
degradation is a source of general loss and harm. 
Temperamentally, environmentalists and conservatives are miles apart; while the Tory 
sups champagne at White’s, the green enjoys nothing so much as creating a new type 
of compost. They move in different circles and have different enemies (often each 
other). Yet I shall argue in this chapter that, both philosophically and pragmatically, 
conservatism is the best-placed ideology for defending our environment. This is a 
deep topic worthy of many more words than I have space for here, but I hope it will 
serve as a taster for the possibilities of future conservative thinking. 
In this chapter I will focus mainly on the issue of climate change, but I hope that a 
germ of an approach to unrelated environmental problems is visible in the discussion. 
We certainly should not forget that climate change is only one environmental issue. 
Some others can be addressed alongside it, as they have related causes (for example 
the acidification of the sea). Often issues are complementary, for example reducing 
the amount of waste produced by households and industry. There are many arguments 
about whether agriculture should be efficient or organic (for example there is at least 
some evidence that importing food from the developing world actually helps rather 
than  hinders  the  efforts  against  climate  change,  despite  greater  transport  costs, 
because poor farmers create far fewer emissions than industrialised Europeans). On 
the other hand, policies such as the creation of biofuels undermine diversity and food 
security. Finally, there is a clear contradiction between mitigating climate change and 
preserving the coastal and rural environment when it comes to developing renewable 
sources of energy such as wind power and onshore wave power. 
The human world also needs conserving, as well as the natural environment. The 
conservative should try to conserve landscapes of significance, whether they serve 
cultures’ sense of history and memory,
2 their ideals (in the way that rural France 
expresses an ideal) or their leisure behaviour. Cities ought to be liveable, pleasant 
places  with  green  spaces,  non-oppressive  architecture  and  clean  air.
3  Landscapes, 
cities and villages sustain ways of life, and simultaneously slow down the willed pace 
of change. Such environments cannot be designed, but they can evolve and should be 
protected. 
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The need for green policy 
The problem that climate change poses for any kind of politics is that the following 
propositions are all true, yet few find all five palatable. 
1.  The world is warming at least partly thanks to human intervention, use of 
fossil fuels, etc, as far as the best science can tell. 
2.  These interventions cannot easily be reversed. Human societies cannot simply 
cease to use fossil fuels. There is currently no conceivable way to replace them 
in total with alternatives such as nuclear power, wind power or solar power. 
3.  As we would expect from the knowledge principle, we cannot expect science 
to deliver certainty about (1). There will be no unequivocal proof either of its 
truth or its falsity, and so politicians will always have to balance risk, short 
and long term considerations, and the prospects of electoral success. 
4.  On  the  international  scene,  there  is  no  easy  way  to  broker  a  compromise 
between the wealthy nations which have largely caused the problem, and the 
developing  nations  which  are  currently  blameless,  but  whose  projected 
emissions  will  be  extremely  damaging  in  the  future.  Yet  curbing  those 
emissions threatens to prevent development and entrench poverty. 
5.  Free  people,  whether  voters  in  democracies  or  consumers  in  free  markets, 
show  very  few  signs  of  being  prepared  to  accept  the  need  for  personal 
sacrifice. 
Change, innovation and risk are the objects of conservative interest. The knowledge 
principle stresses the uncertainty of science in complex areas. Computer models of 
climate – one of the most complex dynamic systems that are routinely modelled – 
cannot  expect  to  be  accurate,  especially  over  the  relevant  timescales.  As  Nigel 
Lawson,  a  former  British  Chancellor  who  has  recently  entered  the  debate  about 
climate  change,  has  cogently  argued,  just  because  a  computer  model  indicates 
problems ahead, it does not follow that what is modelled needs protection.
4 We should 
not confuse the model with the system. 
However, although the knowledge principle encourages scepticism, evidence -based 
policy is essential. The conservative must take notice of the broad and increasing 
scientific consensus that human effects on climate are becoming evident, and will be 
more marked through the coming century unless action is taken to curb the production 
of  greenhouse  gases.  Current  levels  of  greenhouse  gases  including  CO 2  in  the 
atmosphere will tend to push global temperatures higher. Worst-case scenarios, which 
are by no means certain to happen, suggest that by 2100 the change in temperature 
from pre-industrial levels will be greater than the difference between those levels and 
the world at the time of the last ice age. 
Current  attempts  to  mitigate  the  human  effects  on  climate  are,  if  the  science  is 
remotely  plausible,  clearly  inadequate.  They  will  slow  rather  than  halt  or  reverse 
warming, even if ambitious targets are met (and it is doubtful they will be). CO2, 
remains in the atmosphere for centuries. Re-establishing levels from a previous era 
(1990 is often used as a baseline) would be an economic and political nightmare. 
Furthermore, as the world grows gradually richer, a trend of people moving from a 
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vegetarian to an omnivorous diet seems to be accelerating, which, if served by the 
worldwide  agricultural  industry,  would  result  in  massive  increases  of  atmospheric 
methane, an even more potent greenhouse gas, from farm animals.  
The  greater  prominence  of  climate  change  in  political  discussion  has  not  been 
accompanied by the required shift in economic and political priorities. Cap-and-trade 
systems for managing carbon have been rigged by giveaways which have lowered its 
price and undermined the creation of incentives for active management of emissions. 
Recession  and  high  oil  prices  between  them  should  slow  economic  activity  with 
correspondingly positive effects on the environment (post-Kyoto recession in Russia 
meant that their emissions fell below the 1990 baseline level without their having to 
try to reduce them), yet politicians see no trade-off here, and work tirelessly to create 
economic growth  and lower the price of energy, often berating oil companies for 
profiteering. In a contest between the environment and the economy, there will only 
ever  be  one  winner.
5  Meanwhile,  even  relatively  environmentally -friendly 
governments like that of Germany are chary of taking meas ures against important 
polluting industries (in the case of the Germans, coal). In the United Kingdom, the 
New Labour government, despite its occasional adoption of a green tinge, fought shy 
of taking on the road or the airport lobbies. And many of the Bri tish reductions of 
emissions came on the back of opportunistic policies that have little to do with 
valuing the environment per se; the greater use of gas rather than more expensive coal 
for electricity generation has been an entirely economic decision which could easily 
be reversed. 
The  conservative  is  sceptical  about  science,  but  not  antipathetic.  Many  supposed 
climate-change  ‘sceptics’  are  not  sceptics  at  all  –  they  dogmatically  deny  its 
possibility. This is not a position available to the conservative. No conservatism worth 
the name can disregard the contradictory and confusing evidence, the dire predictions 
of the scientific models, the soundness of their bases, their massive uncertainty and 
not least the interests of the scientists themselves in fomenting fear and garnering 
funding. The conservative may believe the threat is overstated, or understated, but it is 
not an option for her to refuse to engage with the debate. 
Global  warming  presents  a  risk,  and  the  conservative  is  risk-averse.  The  risk  is 
massive in extent, affecting billions of people, possibly very drastically. On the other 
hand, there is also evident risk in restructuring entire economies and ways of life to 
address warming. Drastic measures could waste a lot of resources. This is a difficult 
balance for the conservative but at least it sets the tone for political debate. In the 
event of a clash of risk perceptions, a sensible mid-way is to canvass the possibility of 
incremental and reversible actions to mitigate each type of risk, hedging between the 
two and supporting further investigation until the evidence starts to come in.
6 In the 
context of global warming, this will inevitably be less than either side wishes, more 
expensive than the sceptics want and not enough to ward off the worst-case scenarios. 
However, the sceptics demand too much certainty before they will take the risk 
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seriously,  and  the  environmentalists  season  their  rhetoric  with  arbitrary  deadlines, 
limits and thresholds. 
When risk is unquantifiable, risk perceptions and political considerations become as 
important as scientific data – an essentially culturally-dependent point of which the 
conservative is aware and with which she is better able to deal than most. As Beck 
puts it: 
The more overtly global risks elude the scientific methods for calculating them, 
the more influential becomes the perception of risk. The distinction between 
real risks and the perception of risk becomes blurred. Who believes in a risk and 
why becomes more important than the sophisticated probability scenarios of the 
experts.
7 
Conservatism and the precautionary principle  
In  this  context,  it  is  worth  contrasting  the  conservative  attitude  to  risk  with  the 
precautionary principle, an idea adopted by some environmentalists. This has been 
defined in a number of often mutually inconsistent ways
8 but: 
The essential idea behind the principle is that, in the face of uncertainty about 
the possible harm associated with some activity or technology, greater emphasis 
should be placed on providing evidence that harm will not result. In the absence 
of  such  evidence  of  ‘no  harm’,  the  principle  suggests  that  an  activity  or 
technology  should  be  restricted  to  protect  against  possible  (potential  or 
theoretical) harm until evidence of safety is reliably established.
9 
The precautionary principle (PP) is intended to prevent or minimise risk, drawing the 
line at tolerating even the risk of a risk.
10 It is widely considered to be incoherent,
11 
and  many  radical  greens  also  distance  themselves  from  it  (often  associating  it, 
interestingly, with conservatism).
12 This last is a false association but the contrast 
helps  establish  the  parameters  of  the  conservative’s  attitude  to  change.  It  is 
straightforward to enumerate the differences. 
1.  The conservative does not insist on establishing that harm will not result from 
change or risk-taking. Given the knowledge principle, she will consider such 
evidence  uncertain  anyway.  Rather,  she  wants  to  be  reassured  that  the 
expectation of harm is relatively low compared with the potential benefits. 
2.  Evidence of ‘no harm’ will almost always be extremely hard to determine. 
Certain defined risks can be investigated, but to show that no harm is possible, 
it needs to be established that even unanticipated risks can be discounted – but 
this is next to impossible. What evidence can be brought to bear against a risk 
that  no-one  has  yet  formulated?  This  requirement  goes  way  beyond  the 
conservative’s worry about unintended consequences. The PP is therefore a 
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recipe for stasis. Humankind has discovered many things, including fire and 
the PP; luckily we discovered fire first, because had it been the other way 
around the PP would have ruled out using it under any circumstances. 
3.  The conservative’s scepticism also rules out her accepting that ‘no harm’ is 
possible. The PP contains no injunction against change; if the possibility of 
harm is ruled out, then the innovation, according to the PP, can be carried 
through, however drastic it is. For the conservative, the knowledge principle 
tells her that that, whatever has been proven about ‘no harm’ to the satisfaction 
of the experts, something may still go awry, and hence the change principle 
means that she will still harbour concerns about change. Small-c conservatism 
is a philosophy of risk and change, while the PP is concerned entirely with 
risk, and not at all with change (although it will in many cases prevent change 
happening). 
4.  The PP is a universal principle. For the conservative, however, ‘acceptably 
small’ is a term relative to the society for which she is legislating. A country 
such as the US has a strong tolerance of risk, and so an American conservative 
will typically be less cautious.  European nations  will be more  cautious. A 
nation which is clearly dysfunctional, such as, say, Somalia or Afghanistan, 
might well be prepared to accept a greater expectation of harm relative to 
benefits because improvement of the dysfunctional is a greater good than the 
preservation of the functional when little is functioning. 
Hence conservatism is less risk-averse and more context-aware than the precautionary 
principle, and fundamentally concerned with managing and mitigating the effects of 
change. The PP, on the other hand, is a binary maxim by which change, however 
radical,  is  either  allowed  or  forbidden.  Small-c  conservatism  is  an  attitude  of 
scepticism towards, but not rejection of, risk and change. How this works itself out in 
the environmental context is explored in the next section. 
The fundamental incoherence at the heart of green 
philosophy 
Green  philosophy  comes  in  two  forms,  ecologism,  a  thoroughgoing  focus  on  the 
environment as the prime source of value, and environmentalism, a more pragmatic 
ideology  of  managing  the  environment  using  existing  structures  where  possible.
13 
Ecologism is of course incompatible with conservatism for several dozen reasons of 
which the main two are that it does not support a plurality of values, and it demands 
radical  change  not  only  in  political  structures  but  also  human  nature. 
Environmentalism  is  of ten  disregarded  by  ideological  ecologism  as  deluded  (its 
hypothesis that drastic action is not necessary to save the planet being the sticking 
point), and may, in some guises, be consistent with conservatism. Andrew Dobson, a 
leading philosopher of ecologism, denies that environmentalism is an ideology at all, 
which seems like a draconian use of Occam’s razor to me. 
Nevertheless these fraternal disputes are not the business of the conservative, their 
resolution  rendered  irrelevant  by  a  fundamental  contradiction  at  the  heart  of 
ecologism (and indeed environmentalism, in at least some of its forms). Ecologism is 
torn between democracy and authoritarianism. Green philosophies are big on self-
determination, localism, direct democracy and quasi-anarchistic social and political 
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structures.
14 Oppressive institutions, and the false consciousness they impart, get the 
blame for much environmental damage. Debate, discussion and self-determination are 
the answer; liberate the individual. 
Which is all very well, but when t here is a single privileged source of value in your 
philosophy, then the obvious problem with self-determination is that some people will 
determine for themselves that they will ignore, or rebel against, the governing creed. 
Democracy and localism are fine   unless a lot of local communities vote against 
recycling  and  wind  farms  and  too  many  individuals  prefer  internal  combustion 
engines to bicycles. 
In such circumstances, what will greens do? Will recalcitrants be marched at gunpoint 
to the recycling centre  by bobble-hatted Gauleiters, or will they be allowed to free-
ride on the efforts of everyone else? This is not a dilemma that can be resolved; if 
force is eschewed, then ecologism depends on a substantial change in human nature. 
Will that change be imposed, e.g. by propaganda or mass education? Or will it just be 
hoped for? Can the authenticity and autonomy that greens admire be fostered without 
simultaneously crushing independence? It is unlikely. 
Small-c  conservatism  has  three  advantages  over  ecologism.  Firstly,  it  positively 
welcomes diverse sources of value, and so has no comparable dilemma. In particular, 
its notion of environment is associated specifically with human uses, and so is more in 
tune with human societies as they currently exist. It does not accept a conception of a 
‘nature’ – which is an artificial construct anyway – whose value is independent of its 
use and perception by people, and whose preservation should be the sole purpose of 
right-minded  individuals.  Rather,  the  environment,  for  a  conservative,  should  be 
sustainable, in order to lower risks of catastrophes, and should be understood relative 
to  other  social  sources  of  value.  The  environment  thereby  includes  not  only 
wilderness but also well-managed countryside, farmland and agriculture, as well as 
pleasant and civilised villages, towns and cities. 
Secondly, conservatism as an ideology is specifically designed to go with the grain of 
human nature. Human beings are imperfect and difficult, and any politics that does 
not take that into account is doomed. Ecologism, on the other hand, is not afraid to 
seek radical change in human nature,
15 the effects of which (even if it were possible) 
would be potentially dangerous and certainly unpredictable. It is important to note that 
ruralist philosophies designed to re-establish the authentic human relationship with 
the soil have been tried before, in China and Cambodia for instance, with disastrous 
results. 
Thirdly, the conservative has no problem with authority, including scientific authority. 
Modulo the knowledge principle, understanding a set of risks is enough to support a 
debate. If it is determined that remedial or preventative measures are demanded by a 
situation – and it is my view that the current state of climate science, while extremely 
uncertain, does suggest important risks that need to be tackled – then the conservative 
is not shy of legislating and regulating, however inauthentic citizens are deemed to be. 
She is concerned with results, not authenticity. 
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Green conservatism: strategy 
How, then, should the green conservative proceed? I have already suggested that she 
should balance risks and try to amass further scientific evidence if possible. In this 
section I shall elaborate a little further, moving onto specific policy issues in the next. 
Six principles 
The knowledge principle and the change principle suggest six important principles of 
procedure, many of which are actually already implied in current environmental law.
16 
1.  Decision-making should be distributed where possible across relevant actors. 
In  particular,  the  scientific  process  of  risk  assessment  should  be  separated 
clearly  from  the  political  process  of  risk  management,
17  not least because 
different cultures will have different perceptions and tolerances of risk. The 
same decision need not be mandated in the US, Europe or sub-Saharan Africa, 
even though the science is presumably the same and the sea level will rise to 
the same degree. The responsible politician’s role is to interpret the science, 
communicate its findings to the citizenry, and formulate and defend policy. 
2.  Evidence should be amassed and evaluated constantly. A proper scepticism 
means that the data should be tested and added to, not ignored. 
3.  The burden of proof rests with the innovator, but equally the bar should not be 
set so high as to deny the possibility of action at any stage. Furthermore it 
should  be  lowered  if  the  risks  are  shown  to  be  greater.  Good  and  peer-
reviewed science is needed in order to establish risk. Innovation, legislation 
and regulation need to be proportionate. 
4.  This is not simply a cost/benefit analysis. Many of the issues to be balanced 
are  incommensurable.  The  Stern  review  on  climate  change
18  is  to  be 
commended for its ingenuity in addressing the bottom line, but although 
money is a useful lingua franca of value, it is not the only measure. General 
considerations  of  health,  biodiversity,  tradition  and  aesthetics  are  also 
important in different ways across communities. Although there are ways of 
expressing these in economic terms (e.g. via concepts from insurance), they 
cannot and should not be completely monetised. Small-c conservatism stands 
for plurality of value. 
To make a more general point, quantification is a fine and important thing but 
it cannot substitute for objectivity or clarity. Quantification may be a very 
good route to such ends, but it is not the only one, and it is not guaranteed to 
achieve  them  either.  All  claims  to  objectivity  need  to  be  scrutinised  very 
closely,  as  all  sorts  of  assumptions  can  be  smuggled  into  quantitative 
valuation,  whether  unconsciously  or  otherwise.  Discounting  essentially 
qualitative  factors,  such  as  that  of  intergenerational  justice,  reduces  the 
evidence base and narrows the extent of acceptable value sources for decision-
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making.  It  reduces  the  range  of  detectable  risks,  thereby  increasing  the 
likelihood of risky change, against the dictates of the change principle.
19 
5.  Quantification tends to introduce arbitrariness into decision making (‘we must 
keep the probability of a rise in global temperature of x° by time t below y%’ – 
where  do  these  limits  come  from?).  The  evidence  both  quantitative  and 
qualitative  should  be  examined  and  the  current  evaluation  of  the  risks 
informed by several interests and points of view. The knowledge principle 
tells us that there is no single Archimedean point from which to judge these 
matters,  and  the  change  principle  rules  out  the  artificial  use  of  limits  and 
thresholds. In the first place, these can be no more than rough guesses, and in 
the second place what can the significant difference between probabilities of 
y% and (y-1)% possibly be in this context? The policymaker should demand 
neither the elimination, nor the absolute proof, of risk. Decisions should be 
reversible where possible, and incremental. Rigorous evaluation of every step 
is essential, as ever with conservative policymaking. 
6.  It goes without saying that climate change is a worldwide problem, requiring a 
cosmopolitan  approach.  International  cooperation  is  desirable,  and  the 
conservative needs to be open to this. A particularly thorny issue is that of 
causes  and  prognoses  –  the  rich  world  caused  most  of  the  problem,  but 
projected growth is higher in the developing world. This rift has caused most 
of  the  obstacles  in  recent  years  to  concerted  action.  Considerations  of 
intergenerational justice incline me to the view that the rich world has a moral 
duty to make as big a contribution as possible (a judgment shared with Lord 
Lawson).
20 However, the conservative’s understanding of practicality and the 
‘art of the possible’ also makes her realise that no strategy can depend on 
international agreement. The likelihood of the EU, the US, China, India and 
others  all  coming  to  a  global  understanding  of  the  distribution  of 
responsibility, and allowing their sovereignty to be thereby compromised, is so 
close to nil that major international treaties cannot be the starting point for 
addressing the issue. 
Technology 
Technology  will  clearly  be  part  of  any  strategy  to  address  warming.  Some 
technologies will be incremental – greater fuel efficiency on vehicles, for example. 
Others will be more ambitious, and therefore need greater care in their introduction. 
Smart sensors, wirelessly linked, can improve efficiency dramatically in systems by 
providing  a  fuller  picture  of  resource  use  to  human  or  automatic  monitors.  Road 
congestion,  to  take  one  example,  is  incredibly  wasteful  of  time  and  petrol,  and 
increases  pollution;  a  more  efficient  transport  system,  using  real-time  congestion 
monitoring and ultimately smarter cars that can coordinate their position, speed and 
acceleration with nearby vehicles will make an enormous difference. The technology 
to achieve such efficiencies is not many years away. Similar progress will inevitably 
be  made  in  power  provision,  fixing  water  leaks,  reducing  the  costs  of  air  travel, 
monitoring the waste products of agriculture, factories or chemical plants, and so on. 
That is not to say that technology fixes will always work. In Boulder, CO, the world’s 
first really smart electricity grid has been developed, with 20,000 smart meters in 
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place.
21 However, people are not using much less electricity than they did before, 
while the project cost overruns have been large. Boulder is not a small city – a smaller 
pilot would have been welcome – and it seems that the promise of the project may 
have  tempted  regulators  into  relatively  lenient  treatment  of  finance  and  project 
management.
22 Once more the conservative message holds: even if you are convinced 
that global warming is the most important problem humanity faces, bold innovation 
may still be counterproductive. Gather evidence via incremental change instead. 
Patience is a virtue. 
So, in this area, is smallnes s. The beauty of smart systems is that they can be 
introduced  incrementally;  the  larger  the  network  of  sensors,  the  greater  the 
efficiencies that can be gained, but even a small network can improve matters. The 
beauty of better car or aeroplane engines is that they can be rolled out one vehicle at a 
time. On the other hand, some technologies are inevitably large, demanding major 
risky investments. They may promise much, but big technology takes the long and 
winding road from promise to delivery. For example , carbon capture and storage 
(CCS) is a putative method for capturing CO2 as it leaves a power station; many in the 
power generation industry have high hopes for it. However, it will inevitably use a 
great  deal  of  energy  itself  and  will  require  enormous  investment  before  it  is 
commercially viable, in effect wiping out any financial gain from greater efficiency in 
a  power  plant  for  decades.  Furthermore  it  is  completely  unknown  how  efficient 
carbon storage will be (some studies make extraordinary predictions, such as an IPCC 
report that claimed that it would be likely that 99% of CO2 in storage would remain so 
for 1,000 years, an assertion whose content must be dwarfed by the potential error).
23 
None of this suggests that CCS should not be pursued, but engineer s, governments 
and investors should be aware of the risk that large, risky investments can crowd out 
smaller projects with more certain gains. 
The risks of the last resort 
One thing we should not do is hope that a quick technical fix will emerge in the event 
that the risk is underestimated. Lawson suggests that we carry on more or less as we 
are,  adapting  (with  flood  defences,  GM  crops  and  other  measures)  when  climate 
change forces us and otherwise following market signals. This is standard neo-liberal 
strategy, but Lawson also addresses the major concern of greens that this approach 
may allow things to drift until suddenly catastrophe happens and it is too late to do 
anything about it. His idea is that so-called geoengineering can be brought into play if 
drastic measures are required; although ‘there is no hard scientific evidence to suggest 
that catastrophes of this kind may be in the offing, nor is it plausible that they could 
suddenly emerge without warning … there is almost certainly a viable measure to 
keep in our back pocket for use should the highly unlikely threat of catastrophe ever 
loom large.’
24 
                                                 
21 http://smartgridcity.xcelenergy.com/, Stephanie Simon, ‘The more you know …’, Wall Street 
Journal, 9
th Feb, 2009. 
22 Paul Mauldin, ‘Boulder smart grid: handicapped from the start?’ Intelligent Energy Portal, 6
th Sept, 
2010, http://intelligentenergyportal.com/article/boulder-smart-grid-handicapped-start. 
23 Bert Metz, Ogunlade Davidson, Heleen de Coninck, Manuela Loos & Leo Meyer (eds.), Carbon 
Dioxide Capture and Storage, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press/Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change, 2005, http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/special-reports/srccs/srccs_wholereport.pdf, 246. 
24 Lawson, An Appeal to Reason, 87. O’Hara, Conservatism, sample chapter    10 
Geoengineering is the application of technology on a large scale to cool the planet 
quickly. It is, of course, entirely theoretical. Nevertheless, two basic strategies have 
emerged: to reduce the amount of sunlight the earth receives, and to remove CO2 from 
the atmosphere. Examples of the former include measures to whiten clouds to increase 
their reflective power, and to blast aerosols into the atmosphere to impede the sun’s 
rays (Lawson’s favourite). CO2 could possibly be removed by capturing it at source 
and burying it, or by fertilising the oceans with iron in order to encourage plankton to 
absorb more of it. Lawson calls geoengineering a ‘worthwhile precautionary policy.’
25 
For the conservative, this  kind  of technical  rationality is  anathema.  If  anything is 
certain in this area, it is that the disruption of the sun’s rays will have effects as 
dramatic as global warming on local temperatures, ocean currents and the like. The 
oceans,  which  have  received  an  appalling  battering  from  humankind  in  the  last 
century, host highly degraded ecosystems close to land, and filling them full of iron is 
likely to produce extraordinary unintended consequences. 
The change principle tells us to rebalance risk and potential benefit; the risks involved 
in any geoengineering project large enough to  be effective must surely, except in 
circumstances  much more extreme than  Lawson envisages,  outweigh the potential 
benefit. The conservative can probably console herself with the thought that, if the 
world could not agree on a relatively simple set of principles at Copenhagen in 2009, 
it will almost certainly be unable to get its act together to cooperate on an engineering 
project on such a giant scale.
26 
Green conservatism: policy 
Green  conservatism  is  an  opportunity  to  put  principles  into  practice  against  a 
vociferous minority of green ideologues, and a somewhat sceptical, apathetic and (let 
it be said, even in a democracy) selfish majority of voters and consumers. The task is 
made harder, (a) by the rather cavalier treatment of the environment by past right 
wing  governments  which  has  had  the  effect  that  conservatives  are  not  trusted  on 
conservation (although as a matter of fact the degradation of the environment was 
infinitely  worse  in  socialist  countries  across  the  iron  curtain),  and  (b) by  the 
puritanism and scare tactics of radical greens which must take some of the blame for 
widespread  doubt.  In  this  section  I  shall  discuss  some  matters  of  policy,  before 
moving onto philosophical and moral issues of concern. 
Mobilising markets 
The conservative understands the importance of markets because of their integration 
with  human  life  and  society.  They  cannot  and  should  not  be  neglected  in 
environmental considerations. In fact, many problems with green policies as they are 
currently implemented stem from governments’ trying to determine outcomes from 
the  top  down  instead  of  creating  ways  for  small-scale  decisions  to  shape  our 
environmental future. The conservative may disagree with Hayek that the price signal 
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is the only accurate or important parameter for determining resource allocation, but 
she certainly understands its value, and unlike others concerned with environmental 
issues, is prepared to exploit its potential. 
A  number  of  obvious  points  can  be  made  with  respect  to  the  use  of  markets  to 
regulate  the  environment.  First,  pricing  should  be  more  sensitive  to  social  cost. 
Polluters should have to pay – even when they pollute resources held in common, 
such as the deep ocean. Disposal costs for goods and packaging should be factored in 
where possible; there are a number of methods for doing this, but the most obvious is 
to make manufacturers responsible for clearing up (a practice known as ‘extended 
producer responsibility’ or ‘product stewardship’).
27 This method has generally been 
used  for  specific  products  such  as  tyres  or  electronic  goods,  but  in  2010  Maine 
became the first US state to introduce a law covering, in principle, everything. Canada 
has experimented with such methods for a while. 
Second, green principles need to be supported against producer power. The dirtier 
industries in the US have been able, by judicious financing of politicians’ campaigns, 
to make themselves sacrosanct. Even in Germany, one of the more environmentally 
sensitive places on the planet, mining interests had enough political clout to wreck the 
EU’s  emissions  trading  system.  Loopholes  should  be  plugged  where  they  can; 
environmental laws, like other regulatory codes, should be made as simple and clear 
as possible, without get-outs for determined lobbyists. 
Third,  general  taxes  (e.g.  on  emissions)  are  a  better  tool  than  bans  or  specific 
measures  against  specific  industries,  practices  or  technologies.  Regulators  may 
decide, for instance, that methane needs to be tackled as a potent greenhouse gas. Fair 
enough, but the way to do this is not to penalise particular sources of methane such as 
landfill sites, but rather to set standards for methane emissions across the board. This 
would  encourage  the  development  of  methods  in  all  relevant  areas,  including 
managing landfill, that met agreed standards. 
Fourth, markets are better than targets. Most nations have targets for recycling, for 
instance, but the knowledge principle tells us that we cannot know the best balance 
between recycling and production from scratch. Quite apart from the potential for 
absurdity (in some places in the UK, targets were set for collecting recyclable goods 
but not for recycling itself, so recyclable waste was collected separately and then 
remixed with other waste for disposal),
28 it is purely dogma to state that ‘all’ materials 
should be recycled, or ‘80%’ – why not 78% or 82%? Sometimes, recycling can be 
hard on the environment because of the need for transport and collection. Far better to 
find measures to price in the externalities of non-recycled goods, and let the sum of 
individual consumption decisions determine the balance. 
Finally, it is often said that those nations which take an environmental lead will be 
disadvantaged. There are certainly important issues about free-riding in international 
trade  –  many  nations  are  completely  unmoved  by  the  need  for  environmental 
regulation except when they see the lack of it elsewhere as an excuse to ban imports. 
The conservative is of course alive to the fact that money is not the only measure of 
value, and so should be prepared to give environmental considerations due weight. 
Even so, it is clearly important to develop best practice and to try different approaches 
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in creating markets, because ultimately these will be the best tools available. Certainly 
if we wait for international agreement before anyone tries anything, the environment 
will suffer, as analysis of current initiatives clearly shows. 
The inadequacy of markets and the difficulty of making the 
green case 
Having said all that, economics narrowly defined in neo-liberal terms cannot be the 
sole basis for decision-making. Pricing structures determine what is an externality and 
what is endogenous, and the decision as to what affects pricing beyond basic producer 
costs is political, not economic. In particular, a green conservative is prepared to forgo 
income  for  other  goods,  which  might  include  not  only  a  reduced  risk  of  climate 
change, but also beautiful countryside, peace and quiet, clean air, unpolluted coastal 
waters,  magnificent  old  buildings  and  churches,  rich  and  diverse  fauna  and  flora, 
hunting traditions or whatever. 
Helping, or causing, the economy to adapt to the use of fewer carbon-based resources 
is a part of that effort. There is no reason to believe this will be very costly, although 
the slippery nature of the risks involved makes it impossible to be certain. Stern’s 
estimate of the cost is low, but makes a number of questionable assumptions. The 
knowledge principle applies. Stern’s optimism means that error correction is more 
likely  to  be  at  the  pessimistic  end;  slowing  climate  change  is  likely  to  be  more 
expensive rather than less. 
Those sceptics who are unimpressed with Stern’s argument ignore the fact that merely 
reconceptualising exogenous costs as endogenous does not affect the total cost of the 
environmental effort. The problem for the green is that the responsibilities for bearing 
costs will change, so that some people will gain and others lose depending on which 
costs are priced in, and which not. We can be more specific; with greener policies, 
many of the costs will be shifted from future generations to us in the here and now, 
and many will be shifted from the developing world to the rich world. Hence it is 
probably  the  case  that  a  determined  effort  to  address  climate  change  and  other 
orthogonal environmental issues will increase the burden on current voters in wealthy 
democracies.  Most  objective  observers  will  also  note  that  not  only  are  these  the 
people most capable of taking on that burden, but also that they and their ancestors 
bear most responsibility for the mess in the first place. That does not mean that it will 
be an easy case to make. 
David Cameron took great strides in opposition
29 to promote green policy, and to 
obliterate  the  impres sion  of  the  British  Conservative  Party  as  insensitive  to 
environmental  issues,
30  and  in  2009,  as  the  depth  of  the  credit  crunch  became 
increasingly obvious, the Conservatives published a brave green paper about the 
transition to a low-carbon UK economy.
31 Brave, but nevertheless not brave enough. 
It is true that, as the green paper suggested, it ‘will help create hundreds of thousands 
of jobs’ in a new green economy (and the proposals, such as a smart electricity grid, 
are  admirable  and  extremely  sensible),  but  it  seems  hardly  likely  that  these  new 
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opportunities will offset corresponding losses in the economy’s grubbier sectors. The 
green  paper  argued  that  ‘the  reckless  accumulation  of  carbon  dioxide  in  our 
atmosphere will impose costs on our children and their children,’ which is true, but if 
forgoing the benefits of that accumulation now were without cost for us, then surely 
we would do it. If, as it maintained, it is ‘selfish’ for current consumers and producers 
to continue to produce carbon emissions, then they must benefit economically from it. 
It is not selfish to do something self-harming. 
Greening the economy will be a hard sell, particularly in a global recession. I believe 
that doing so is in the interests of individuals and society both in the developed and 
the developing world, but it is not in the hard-headed short-to-medium term financial 
interests of many investors in the economy as currently constituted, nor of a majority 
of consumers in the rich world. It needn’t be super-painful, but it might be costly for 
some and tedious in terms of changing behaviour. I fear that the Tory line (shared, 
incidentally, with Stern) that this is a great opportunity did we but know it, may be 
sowing the seeds of future disillusion. 
The failure of Copenhagen 
Nevertheless, two and a half cheers for Cameron for pursuing the greenery which so 
marked his first year as leader.
32 The green paper’s policies seem eminently sensible 
although its politics are over-optimistic. Indeed, optimism, wilfulness or just plain 
ineptitude  marks  almost  every  aspect  of  environmental  politics,  ranging  from 
dogmatic ‘scepticism’ from characters such as Christopher Booker, cretinous hopes 
for radical change from green theorists, the wrong-headed pursuit of consumerism, 
mendacity from some leading climate scientists, disinformation from the energy and 
mining sectors, and the inability of governments to eschew the politics of the pork 
barrel. We must hope that crisis does not occur, because otherwise this generation will 
get  a  very  bad  press  from  historians  of  the  future  (assuming  that  they  are  not 
underwater). 
As a case in point, consider the Copenhagen Conference on climate change that took 
place at the end of 2009,
33 which ended unsurprisingly in a weak deal of little value. 
Although this was hardly a cause for celebration, neither was it the disaster it was 
portrayed as. The fact is that high stakes summitry is the worst possible method for 
trying to address the multifarious issues behind global warming. Any successes that 
can be achieved in such a crucible are to be welcomed – but they are not to be relied 
upon. Kyoto went surprisingly well, largely thanks to the refusal of the US to engage 
(and  thereby  throw  its  weight  about),  and  the  failure  to  place  any  meaningful 
requirements on poorer countries, but that will be the exception, not the norm. 
The knowledge principle and the change principle entail a deep suspicion of targets 
and arbitrary thresholds, yet the Copenhagen approach, with its inflated rhetoric of 
‘humankind’s last chance’, its idiotic strategy of setting global emissions targets, and 
its  insane  method  of  authorising  fixed  transfers  of  resources  between  countries 
($100bn a year by 2020, another target), went headlong in that direction. 
The social and climate engineers of Copenhagen wanted to solve the problem, despite 
that fact that it is not a problem that can be solved. CO2 stays in the atmosphere for 
centuries, so a great deal of the damage is to all intents and purposes irreversible, 
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while  it  is  hard  to  see  methane  production  doing  anything  other  than  growing 
dramatically over the next few decades. If we carry on as we are the situation looks 
like deteriorating, but even on optimistic projections it is likely to get worse, albeit at 
a  slower  rate.  This  is  not  a  binary  yes/no,  OK-we’ve-solved-it/nope-it’s-a-disaster 
situation. If the science is remotely accurate, then the situation will get worse. We 
don’t know how much worse it will get, whether it will be tolerable (and indeed how 
many  people  will  be  unequivocally  better  off),  or  whether  it  will  be  genuinely 
catastrophic. Reality will unfold, making targets irrelevant; there is a continuum on 
which any target will be an arbitrary point. We might hit the targets and everything be 
a disaster, or we might miss them and everything be hunky dory. 
The mobilisation of targets is a huge mistake. Any target system will set up perverse 
incentives and provide all sorts of unintended consequences as everyone merrily tries 
to  free-ride  and  game  the  system.  The  awkward  mixture  of  past  and  future 
responsibility  for  the  problem  means  that  there  will  be  no  way  of  distributing 
responsibility for reaching the target  equitably. Any target must have a long-term 
component, and no government can possibly commit its successors in a binding way. 
Furthermore, it is extremely difficult to plan sensibly through time; it is all too easy to 
promise major cuts in the future, while making minor cuts now. 
If mitigation is not a solution, neither is adaptation. It is quite likely that some nations 
could  adapt  to  some  of  the  inconveniences  (e.g.  with  flood  defences),  and  other 
nations  might  gain  as  cold  lands  become  more  fertile.  Other  places,  even  well-
resourced ones, will make a mess of adaptation. It may be hugely expensive (and not 
cost-effective, as Stern argues), or relatively sensible. Certainly a willingness to adapt 
is required, but it is not enough. It is quite possible that the science is wrong and that 
the changes required are small, making adaptation possible – but we do not know that 
now. 
Having said that, adaptation, as Michael Grenfell has suggested to me, must be part of 
the picture for a conservative. The knowledge principle tells us that any mitigating 
measure will be based on uncertain projections into the future. Furthermore, having 
implemented such a measure, we will never know whether the projections were right 
even with hindsight (because the implemented measure will have changed the relevant 
parameters).  On  the  other  hand,  adaptation,  which  is  a  response  to  actual 
circumstances in a manner appropriate for a particular community, is consistent with 
the knowledge and change principles. 
We have to accept that the only possible way to address the issue is by a combination 
of anticipatory changes in behaviour and adaptation. We should expect to have to 
build flood defences or develop drought-resistant crops while still moving away from 
the carbon economy. And even if we did all this, it is extremely unlikely that this will 
stop global warming. All we can realistically hope to do is slow it down. 
There is no doubt that there will have to be transfers of money from the rich world 
(which  can  afford  it,  and  which  largely  caused  the  problem),  to  the  poor  (which 
cannot and did not). But – as Copenhagen showed – there is no way that the requisite 
figure could be agreed in advance of agreement on measures. This is partly because 
we genuinely do not know what measures will be required, and partly because we 
cannot know what measures will be possible over the relevant timescales (e.g. will it 
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Perhaps the main reason why there will be no advance agreement is that the rich 
countries will refuse to make one. It is a political impossibility. If the EU, the USA 
and Japan cannot make the relatively small compromises required, say, to keep the 
WTO  talks  going,  or  to  preserve  fishing  stocks,  or  to  produce  a  more  globally 
sensitive set of subsidies for agriculture, then they are hardly likely to write an open-
ended cheque for climate change. Few nations have made a serious effort to explain to 
voters that this requires an engaged approach from everyone. This is not something 
that can only be solved by top down targets and legislation; there needs to be buy-in 
in all strata of society. Similarly, very few of the key nations are willing to sacrifice 
sovereignty  to  make  targets  binding.  The  USA  very  rarely  binds  itself  to  any 
agreement. France is always fiercely protective of her interests and is prepared to 
break agreements or stretch them to the limit. Given China’s stances over all sorts of 
issues over the last twenty years, it would hardly be likely to agree to a transparent 
verification regime. 
It is obvious that a ‘global response’ will always founder. No world government will 
emerge any time soon, although some in the green movement continue to cling to the 
hope that there will be one, as a monument to their unworldliness.
34 Even if global 
agreements can be achieved, they still will have to be implemented by national 
governments.  Furthermore,  any  system  of  penalt ies,  sanctions  or  fines  will  be 
shrugged off by the powerful, and will merely exacerbate the problems of the poor. 
Ultimately, addressing global warming will involve persuading as many national 
governments as possible to make serious efforts, persuasion that will sometimes come 
from international organisations, sometimes from business, sometimes from voters. 
Indeed,  the track  record  so  far shows  that  small  countries,  usually  with  highly 
homogeneous  populations,  have  made  most  inroads;  the  larger  and  more 
heterogeneous the polity, the worse the record.
35 
There are clearly too many interests and factors to be dealt with at a single conference 
(compare the experience of trade talks in the past). Rich democracies have sceptical 
voters to convince, sometimes in the context of extremely polarised domestic politics 
(in particular the USA). Some nations bear little historical responsibility, but can be 
expected to increase emissions dramatically in the future (China, India). Some nations 
have serious problems with governance. Some worry not so much about reducing the 
carbon  economy,  but  rather  are  faced  with  the  extremely  difficult  problem  of 
preventing deforestation in remote areas (Brazil, Indonesia). The Arctic nations, if not 
their polar bears, will benefit from th e melting of sea ice. Other nations, such as 
Tuvalu, may disappear entirely in short order. For many, particularly in Africa, the 
issue is food and migration. The Copenhagen conference fractured along all these 
lines, as it was bound to do. 
This is all about complexity, as the knowledge and change principles warn us. There 
will not be an answer, the solution. What is absolutely extraordinary is that so many 
people  think  there  might  be  –  and  that  so  much  was  put  at  stake  for  it  at  the 
Copenhagen  summit  in  2009.  And  note  also  that  even  if  there  was  a  ‘solution’, 
achieving it would not enable us to chalk it up as a success and move onto the next 
issue; if the science is correct, the need for vigilance against climate change will be 
forever with us. 
                                                 
34 George Monbiot, The Age of Consent: A Manifesto for a New World Order, London: Flamingo, 
2003. 
35 Cf. Giddens, The Politics of Climate Change, 75-80. O’Hara, Conservatism, sample chapter    16 
What, then, can be done? One point crying out to be made is that every measure helps. 
We will not solve the problem by hitting a target, but any successful measure will 
ameliorate the global problem to an extent. The more ambitious the better – unless 
being  ambitious  makes  it  more  likely  to  fail.  Evaluation  should  be  rigorous,  as 
unintended consequences  may make us  worse  off in  the  end. The more schemes, 
better evaluated, the quicker best practice will spread. 
It follows that there is no need to await international agreement. There is no need for a 
ten-  or  twenty-  or  thirty-year  plan,  or  to  promise  3,000  wind  farms  across  the 
Highlands of Scotland or a giant solar panel over the Mojave Desert by 2025. Let the 
British first see whether 10 wind farms are useful, before building another 10 if they 
help,
36 and let the Americans start a solar power programme without waiting for the 
Chinese to agree on transparency. Let the French specialists Areva build some nuclear 
power stations with their much-vaunted EPR pressurised water technology, and see 
how expensive they are and how they perform (at the time of writing a state-of-the-art 
facility in  Olkiluoto in Finland is  years behind schedule and over €1 billion over 
budget). Let’s be careful with subsidies, but also try to factor the cost of emissions 
into  new  investment  (both  private  and  public),  so  that  capital  is  targeted  most 
efficiently. Let’s experiment with incremental carbon taxes (which are certainly the 
most efficient ways of changing behaviour), starting low and building up. If anyone 
can implement an effective cap-and-trade system (I somehow doubt this, given the 
pressures on politicians to dole out exemptions and subsidies alongside them), then let 
them  try.  Let’s  continue  to  fund  the  science,  and  make  sure  data  are  open  and 
accurate. Let’s step up efforts on monitoring (unbelievably, there is no better method 
of working out the level of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere than asking emitters 
what they are emitting – funding for direct sampling of the atmosphere is being cut at 
the time of writing
37). And most important, if we find that others are free -riding on 
our efforts (and it can be absolutely guaranteed that someone will), then let’s not 
retreat  into  cutting-off-nose-to-spite-face  behaviour  such  as  rolling  back  carbon 
reduction programmes or launching trade wars. 
There are two clear conclusions. The first is that this is a long process which will 
never  result  in  complete  success,  but  which  must  be  undertaken  anyway.  Our 
understanding of the risks will change over time, and so will conditions. Scientific, 
political,  geopolitical  and  economic  factors  will  predominate  at  different  times, 
demanding  different  responses  from  different  governments.  National  governments 
will have to do much of the work, but the responses of individuals matter too. There is 
no reason not to take action now, and every reason not to set policy for decades hence. 
Secondly, there is no place in this for ideological back-and-forth. Americans who 
believe  campaigns  to  promote  low-energy  light  bulbs  are  the  first  step  towards 
communism, and greens who get apoplectic about people who drive Porsches  are 
equally  polarising  and  divisive.  Let’s  not  pretend  either  that  science  is  the  only 
perspective that matters. In fact, the ideological stance that best meets the situation is 
conservatism,  the  rejection  of  radical  change  imposed  from  the  top  down.  In  a 
conservative  polity,  the  individual  matters,  and  so  does  the  environment.  The 
conservative’s  value  pluralism  speaks  against  the  consumerist  pursuit  of  material 
wealth and pleasure to the exclusion of all other drives. Economic growth is good, but 
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should never be the only measure of well-being. Small-c conservatism is also rightly 
sceptical of the prospects of sweeping ‘solutions’ to complex problems. 
Balance is the key. Let’s move away from a carbon economy, but try to alleviate the 
pain if and when it arises. Let’s experiment with, and even subsidise, new technology 
and renewable energy sources, but not so much as to distort the energy market too 
radically.  Let’s  engage  in  international  discussion,  but  not  expect  an  unrealistic 
measure of agreement on methods. Let’s try to approach this problem in a moral way, 
without imposing our morality on those who do not share it, and without rejecting the 
occasional grubby compromise (measures need above all to be effective – no point on 
focusing on the symbolic). Let’s try to balance our own interests with those of our 
children and those of our grandchildren. Mainly, let’s take the problem seriously and 
do whatever we can about it now, rather than waiting for agreement about what 7, 8 or 
9 billion people in 200 countries should do for the next 50 years. 
Green conservatism: moral issues 
Concern for the environment is a wrench for a democratic political party, not least 
because polar bears, unborn generations and tropical hardwoods do not vote. Those 
who claim an interest in environmental matters are often less interested in spending 
their own money and time on the issue, than in diverting other people’s resources to 
those  ends.  Ultimately,  selfish  interests  (not  self-interest)  kick  in,  and  the  green 
conservative  (alongside  any  other  committed  green)  must  defend  the  environment 
against short-termism, despoliation and exploitation without a great deal of hope that 
a balancing set of interests can be mobilised electorally. They must rely on moral 
persuasion as opposed to electoral bribes. The final section of this chapter explores 
conservatives’ grounds for hope that this can be achieved. 
Balance is everything. Fixing on green issues and privileging green values above all 
others contradicts the conservative’s insistence on politics as a means of negotiating 
across plurality, and her consequent disapproval of single issue campaigns. The risks 
involved  of  focusing  entirely  on  the  environment,  of  setting  arbitrary  targets  to 
achieve within arbitrary timeframes, and of hoping for a radical change in human 
nature are simply too large to be considered. Balance needs to be achieved partly by 
taking other values into consideration, but also by ensuring that the interpretation of 
the environment  used is  human-centred. The green needs  to  ensure that  a decent, 
aesthetically-pleasing  and  sustainable  environment  for  humans  exists,  rather  than 
kow-towing to a spurious ‘Mother Nature’ who trumps everything. Aesthetics are 
important;  the  representation  of  the  landscape,  as  a  human  construction,  gives  it 
meaning. As Robert Macfarlane puts it: 
The land itself, of course, has no desires as to how it should be represented. It is 
indifferent to its pictures and to its picturers. But maps organise information 
about a landscape in a profoundly influential way. They carry out a triage of its 
aspects, selecting and ranking those aspects in an order of importance, and so 
they create forceful biases in the ways a landscape is perceived and treated.
38 
As, he might have added, do poetry, science and photography. 
Small-c conservatism exists in order to preserve human societies, to allow human self-
expression and the pursuit of human self -interest, and to  support human identity as 
embedded in the various communities in which we find ourselves, voluntarily and 
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involuntarily. To assert that, say, the Amazon rainforest matters more than the people 
in it is romantic and wrong, and will lead to its destruction (as rainforest dwellers 
certainly have a much more powerful say in its fate than do European, or even urban 
Brazilian, environmentalists). The job  of the conservative is  to  find the language, 
images and policies to emphasise the aesthetic, economic and climatic benefits of the 
rainforest, and how these accrue to the population of the rainforest itself, as well as to 
the  wider  world.  It  is  not  easy,  but  it  certainly  cannot  be  achieved  without 
compromise or negotiation. 
Note also that the desideratum of justifying conservatism by public reason demands a 
humancentric point of view. Anything else is a type of special pleading which will not 
meet the public reason test; it will not appeal to those who are not already persuaded. 
Anyway, one should be suspicious of people who appoint themselves spokespersons 
for trees, forests, endangered animals or ‘Gaia’ – no-one voted for them, particularly 
not the objects they claim to represent. 
The value of wilderness varies depending on where it is, what its preservation will 
cost and how wonderful it is (in other words, how accommodating to human values). 
Indeed, it has been argued that ‘wilderness’ per se has disappeared: ‘little on Earth is 
remote  anymore,  and  accelerating  human  pressures  on  the  landscape  threaten  to 
overrun even specialized habitats.’ ‘From the most remote corners of the frozen Arctic 
to the darkest interiors of the Amazon’s tropical rainforests, the impact of humanity 
now  drives  biological  systems.  What  separates  the  Brazilian  rainforest  from  New 
York’s Adirondack Forest Preserve from Manhattan’s Central Park is only a matter of 
degree.’
39 Especially in small, crowded nations, our notions of nature and wilderness 
need to be situated within a landscape already shaped by human hand. Macfarlane 
emphasises the diversity of ‘logics of connection’ between discrete parts of Britain 
and Ireland, yet such connections include human ones, alongside geological links, 
migration lines and movements of weather and light. Places were held together by 
‘the people, alive and dead, who had dwelled in or passed through the landscapes. A 
webbing of story and memory joined up my places, as well as other more material 
affinities.’
40 To take another example, Roger Deakin’s study of wood and woodland 
worldwide is a story not only of wild woods, but managed forests, crafts ancient and 
modern, and even modern art.
41 
Intergenerational justice 
One  vitally  important  aspect  of  conservatism  that  pertains  particularly  to  the 
environment is the idea, very prominent already in Burke’s anti-contractarianism, of 
intergenerational justice, fairness not only to the living, but also the dead, and the yet-
to-be-born. Concern for those who are not  currently  alive makes  the conservative 
unique  (greens  do  have  a  concern  for  the  generations  of  the  future,  but  are  less 
interested in the dead).
42 Our current state depends upon history and context, which 
need to be sympathetically and honestly reported at least as much as present ideas and 
norms. Similarly, our own ultimate fate will depend upon the legacy we leav e to 
future generations. There are many parts to this, including political constitutions, 
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economic  conditions  (including  levels  of  debt),
43  scientific knowledge and artistic 
achievement, but the bequeathed environment is clearly central. 
[O]ne of the first and most leading principles on which the commonwealth and 
its laws are consecrated, is lest the temporary possessors and life -renters in it, 
unmindful of what they have received from their ancestors, or of what is due to 
their prosperity, should act as if  they were the entire masters; that they should 
not think it among their rights to cut off the entail, or commit waste upon the 
inheritance, by destroying at their pleasure the whole original fabric of their 
society; hazarding to leave to those who come aft er them a ruin instead of a 
habitation – and teaching these successors as little to respect their contrivances, 
as they had themselves respected the institutions of their forefathers. By this 
unprincipled facility of changing the state as often, and as much, and in as many 
ways, as there are floating fancies or fashions, the whole chain and continuity of 
the commonwealth would be broken. No one generation could link with the 
other. Men would become little better than the flies of a summer.
44 
Of course Burke  is talking about political institutions here, but given the important 
role of the environment in history, memory, myth and understanding it is clear that it 
falls under his implicit scope. The past is something to which we should do justice, 
which should inform our moral views of ourselves. We have a duty to pass knowledge 
of it to future generations, who of course inherit our history.
45 By concentrating on 
these deep connections across ‘the chain and continuity of the commonwealth’, Burke 
transforms our view of politics from a narrow one based on the current generation 
which is always at risk of being overwhelmed by the fleeting requirements of the 
present moment. An extended group only makes political sense if it is understood 
through time. 
Because a nation is not an idea only of local extent, and individual momentary 
aggregation; but it is an idea of continuity which extends in time as well as in 
numbers and in space. And this is a choice not of one day or one set of people, 
not a tumultuary and giddy choice; it is a deliberate election of ages and of 
generations; it is a constitution made by what is ten thousand times better than 
choice,  it  is  made  by  the  peculiar  circumstances,  occasions,  tempers, 
dispositions and moral, civil, and social habitudes of the people which disclose 
themselves only in a long space of time.
46 
This assertion of the connectivity between past and future shows why international 
responses to address environmental concerns will not work, and that smaller political 
units can and should mobilise. Whereas, as I argued above, there is no serious chance 
of effective global action against climate change, the ‘deliberate election of ages and 
generations’  stands  both  as  a  more  persuasive  idea  for  today’s  generation  of 
consumers and citizens, and as a means to influence actions and attitudes in the future 
(as is surely required). ‘Inheritance furnishes a sure principle of conservation, and a 
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sure principle of transmission; without at all excluding a principle of improvement.’
47 
As the nineteenth-century jurist and American Senator Rufus Choate argued, if we 
teach that ‘all the dead, the living, the unborn .were one moral person’, then ‘the 
engagements of one age may bind the conscience of another.’
48 
It is a telling irony that defenders of social contract philosophy who wish to address 
environmental  concerns  end  up  using  Burke’s  reasoning.  Modern  contractarian 
liberals, following John Rawls, argue that in order to choose a social contract both 
rationally  and humanely, those negotiating  it have to  be hidden behind a ‘veil of 
ignorance’ which blinds them to their own condition (religion, gender, level of wealth, 
etc).
49 This is a somewhat odd notion to begin with, but those liberals who wish to 
apply the Rawlsian paradigm to the environment and other intergenerational concerns 
have to go further, and assume the contract ‘generation blind’ – i.e. one enters into it 
without even knowing whether one is alive, dead, or not yet born.
50 If not, the rational 
economic  man,  left  to  his  own  utility -maximising  devices,  will  always  divert 
resources from future generations to his own – the very ground of Burke’s criticism of 
Rousseau’s original contractarian arguments. The fact that even liberals have to echo 
Burke’s  devastating  critique  reveals  conservatism  as  the  ideology  best  placed  to 
protect the environment. 
Note the greater importance of thick ethical relations over thin moral ones, as the 
conservative has always claimed. Intergenerational justice is a spur for action only if 
we perceive a direct connection with those future generations. In such circumstances, 
‘it makes our weakness subservient to our virtue; it grafts benevolence even upon 
avarice.’
51 We would be much less inclined to act as responsible stewards for the 
environment if we were leaving it to an abstract future in some arbitrarily-defined 
state. 
Virtue and the environment 
It is unfortunate (and ultimately self-defeating) that conservatives historically and the 
political right generally have ignored the claims of the environment over the past two 
or three decades. The tragic irony is that conservatism is built for respect for the 
environment.  Rule-based  morality  cannot  hope  to  succeed  in  this  space. 
Environmentalism,  and  its  need  for  compromise  and  balance,  depends  upon  the 
exercise of virtue, not the following of rules.
52 The most important virtue, vital for a 
conservative, has already been quoted in Burke:  mindfulness, being mindful of one’s 
duties to succeeding generations. One also needs to exercise care, humility, curiosity 
and honesty (especially if one is a scientist). One needs an aesthetic appreciation of 
what we have, and what might be lost, an ability to discriminate between what is 
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valuable and what is not, an ability to compromise and broker between competing 
interests, a long-term rather than a short-term outlook, and a wider set of motivations 
than merely money. Furthermore, one needs the peculiarly conservative combination 
of scepticism (of technocratic claims to fashion and control the environment) and risk 
aversion, and its  corollaries  of tolerance of a plurality of values, and concern for 
intergenerational justice. 
The single-value, rule-based approach to the environment often exacerbates the very 
problems it is meant to solve. For instance, one often wants to limit disruption caused 
by particular human actions or practices rather than eliminating them outright; one 
wants  to  provide incentives  to  do less damage  (for example by securing property 
rights  to  wildlife,  trees  or  land).  The  absolutism  of  ecologism  is  extremely 
problematic here because of a preference for banning damaging activities that could 
be limited and regulated, even though very often the enforcement of such bans is nigh 
on impossible.
53 Similarly, environments need to be managed, but this may require 
human intervention as the lesser of two evils. Disasters may have to happen as part of 
the cycle of renewal, such as the fires that are important events in our environmental 
history. The efforts of forestry managers to eliminate fire have led to the unintended 
consequence of a build-up of undergrowth so that those fires that do take hold are far 
more dreadful, threatening not only woodland but also human habitation.
54 
Another vice of ecologism is the pursuit of symbolic victories, as opposed to the more 
utilitarian focus  on  what  will  work.  Adam  Smith’s  strategy  of  trying  to  motivate 
socially-valuable behaviour via incentives that speak to self-interest rather than finer 
feelings  is  anathema  to  radical  greens.  The  result  of  ignoring  self-interest  is 
dependence on finer feelings, which is not a happy position to be in. 
Meanwhile, those who are neglectful of the environment and prepared to oversee its 
degradation bring opposite vices into the political equation. These include excessive 
individualism  detrimental  to  the  good  functioning  of  the  community,  single-value 
politics  focused around  money  and the Gross  National  Product,  and an insistence 
(shared with radical greens) on judging all situations by unvarying criteria. 
It remains for the conservative to bring environmental issues to the fore, making them 
a routine part of political discourse, while also making it clear that ‘environment’ 
means different things to different people and groups, and that it is meaningless to 
pursue  a  single,  simple  ‘policy’.  The  language  of  balance,  risk  aversion  and 
scepticism  should  be  used  to  broker  between  different  groups  and  their 
incommensurable economic and aesthetic interests. 
Only the conservative can do this. This is her opportunity to claim a vital role in 
tomorrow’s  politics,  and  may  also  be  the  best  hope  for  the  preservation  of  the 
environment as a pleasant, liveable human domain. 
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